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It is often said that the Pacific Basin Region is poised to enter a new 
economic era which will bring new levels of prosperity to its people. Such a 
belief is not totally without foundation; after all, the Pacific contains 
within its boundaries some of the most dynamic and rapidly growing economies 
in the world, many of whom are world leaders in technology and 
industrialization. With its vast ocean areas, the region is rich in marine 
life and its land masses contain substantial quantities of key minerals: 
copper, gold, nickel and phosphate as well as hardwood timbers. Energy 
potential is not insignificant while the strategic value of the region is 
recognised by the Western Alliance which so far as the South Pacific island 
countries are concerned has implications for their ability to secure financial 
aid resources for development. Not for nothing has it been said that the 21st 
century is the era of the Pacific. 
For the small island states of the region, however, the promise of an 
impending 'golden age' needs to be treated with caution. In an uncertain 
world, many key resources may take years to develop, and some with apparent 
promise may yet prove to be commercially nonviable. It is likely that 
meaningful participation by PaCific island countries in the development of 
their fishery resources will continue to be frustrated by lack of capital and 
technical expertise. Distant fishing nations will continue to reap the major 
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benefit until these deficiencies are remedied. And, while rapid growth 
continues to be enjoyed by the Pacific Rim countries, little impact is likely 
to be felt by the smaller islands economies of the region. 
These generalisations aside, it is clear that Pacific Island countries 
differ widely in their resource endowment and their capacity to achieve 
economic growth. The best prospects are held by the larger island countries 
such as Papua New Guinea and Fiji which are relatively well endowed with 
natural resources. With these, the potential is there to sustain cumulative 
growth and to achieve significant economic transformation in the coming 
decade. Far reaching changes in the social and economic life of these 
countries can be expected and these will be manifested through such avenues as 
the attainment of higher levels of social and welfare services; greater 
diversification of economic activity; stronger involvement of foreign capital; 
accelerated urbanisation; and a further decline in subsistence activity. 
In sharp contrast are the prospects for the very small island economies: 
economic growth cannot be envisaged because of poverty of resources combined 
with rapid population growth. Living standards are likely to remain at low 
levels and the absence of economic opportunities will be reflected in 
continuing aid dependence, growing unemployment and pressure to emigrate. 
This paper addresses the contrasting economic condition of Pacific island 
countries, their development prospects and the important influence of regional 
initiatives and foreign. aid. It also reviews recent policy and strategy 
proposals whose implementation could significantly affect future development. 
To simplify, the analysis focuses on three categories of island countries, 
principally those under the Forum umbrella, whose size and resource potential 
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suggest (1) continuing economic growth, (2) limited growth and (3) no growth. 
This three-fold typology is not meant to be all embrasive, e.g., a notable 
omission is the special case of Nauru; but it is convenient for the purpose of 
the present discussion. 
Growth Economics 
This group includes what can be considered the lucky countries of the 
region: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu (and arguably New 
Caldedonia). Together this group accounts for an estimated 3.7 million, or 84 
percent of the region's estimated current population of 4.5 million. Each has 
the potential to achieve cumulative economic growth and structural 
diversification based on the exploitation of both land, sea-based and tourist 
resources. Through a disciplined planning approach and backed up by a 
considerable input of private foreign investment, these countries have already 
made notable advances in developing their resources and in improving their 
living conditions. 
By comparison with many other island countries, this group controls 
fishing zones that are relatively well stocked with tuna and have relatively 
large land areas as a basis for achieving significant agricultural 
diversification, whether it be subsistence food, cash crops, livestock or 
forestry. Rich mineral deposits are found in Papua New Guinea and to a lesser 
extent in Fiji and Solomon Islands. Hydro-carbons have been found in Papua 
New Guinea but hydro-power, biogas and solar energy possibilities are present 
throughout. Forestry is a major resource in Papua New Guinea and Solomon 
Islands while exotic forest varieties are being developed on a large scale in 
Fiji. 
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Considerable success in the exploitation of natural resources including 
minerals, is reflected in exports. Although gold and copper account for just 
over half her export earnings ($480 million out of $913 million in 1982) Papua 
New Guinea can boast at least half a dozen other major natural resource export 
products: coffee, cocoa, copra, copra oil, palm oil, logs and tea. Fiji 
exports are dominated by sugar, which accounts for about half her total export 
earnings, but the degree of diversification is also notable here. Important 
exports include coconut oil, gold, canned fish, ginger and an array of 
processed and manufactured goods such as cement, paint, cigarettes and light 
engineering items. For Solomon Islands the range covers fish, wood products, 
palm oil and copra; and for Vanuatu, copra, cocoa, frozen fish and chilled 
beef. 
Though export earnings have generally been static over the past few years 
due to poor commodity prices, they have nonetheless expanded markedly over the 
decade as a whole. From 1975 to 1982, export earnings (in current values) 
more than doubled for Papua New Guinea and Fiji but multiplied five fold for 
Solomon Islands and three fold for Vanuatu. These are impressive 
performances, meaning in effect that there has been a growth in exports in 
real terms, and in the case of Solomon Islands, a very notable one. 
With exports as an engine of growth, the national incomes of these 
countries also expanded markedly. Fiji's GOP doubled from 1975 to 1982; Papua 
New Guinea's rose by 30 per cent from 1977 to 1981 and from the limited 
evidence available, it appears that it more than doubled for the Solomon 
Islands over the past five year period. This suggests positive values for 
economic growth in real terms (which for Fiji has averaged 3 per cent annually 
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in the period 1977-82) and since these rates were above population growth, 
incomes per head have been rising. This is no mean feat when viewed against 
the adverse effects of the recent global recession. According to available 
national income figures, the level of GOP per head (1982) amounted to $1,637 
for Fiji, $820 for Papua New Guinea and $670 for Solomon Islands (see Table 
1). These are well above income levels recorded for most developing countries 
in the world. 
The major factor underlYing these growth performances has been successful 
export diversification through natural resource development. Minerals have 
played a large part, especially for Papua New Guinea and Fiji, but the 
increased processing of natural resources has been significant. This has been 
an important factor in the expansion of industrial sectors, particularly in 
the case of Fiji where industrial activities and processing now account for at 
least 12 per cent of GOP - the highest in the region. 
The growth momentum continues apace with the development of new major 
resource projects. In Papua New Guinea work has reached an advanced stage on 
the Ok Tedi project in the Western Province to develop huge deposits of gold 
and copper. The mine is said to contain 34 million tons of gold deposits, 
yielding 2.9 grams of gold per ton, and 376 million tons of ores bearing 0.7 
per cent copper, 0.6 grams of gold and about 0.14 grams of silver per ton. 
The cost of bringing the mine into operation is estimated at $1.6 billion 
(1981 prices) and the first stage of the mine opened in 1984, beginning with 
gold. When it is fully operational it will dominate the economy of Papua New 
Guinea in much the same way as Bouganville did in the previous decade. 
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Other major projects being developed in Papua New Guinea are the Ramu 
Sugar project which commenced production in 1982 but with its full potential 
not yet realised; a revival of the tuna industry; timber milling; and survey 
work on several newly discovered mineral deposits. 
In Fiji, the harvesting of vast pinewood forests will make a significant 
impact on the econ~ and will open up many industrial opportunities. New 
sugar acreages are being developed while further major expansion can be 
expected from ginger, cocoa and citrus fruits. Productive projects currently 
being implemented in Solomon Islands encompass forestry, tuna fishing, and a 
commercial venture in palm oil and coconut. 
Limited Growth 
Western Samoa and Tonga are illustrative of this middle level group, where 
agriculture and related activities provide scope for growth, but their future 
potential is restricted by a limited land area and opportunities for major 
industrialisation and tourist development. Additionally, there is little 
indication so far of the existence of commercially exploitable minerals. 
Exports are dominated by 'traditional' products: copra and other coconut 
products, cocoa, bananas and coffee, with a variety of other items including 
light manufactures, but these are small in total. Thus, Western Samoa relies 
heavily on coconut oil, cocoa, taro and timber with coconut cream, beer, soap 
and fruit juice providing a degree of diversification. Tonga's exports are 
dominated by coconut products including coconut oil and desiccated coconut, 
with certain fruit and vegetable items also prominent. Between 1975 and 1981, 
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Western Samoa recorded a slight upward trend in copra coupled with strong 
expansion in taro exports, but the overall performance in real terms has been 
static, a situation also seen in Tonga. 
National income per head is among the lowest in the region, varying 
between $400 and $500. Principally because of this, Western Samoa has been 
classified as a least Developed Country (lDC) by the United Nations. Some 
growth in real national income appears to have occurred during the 1970's but 
the recent experience has been one of decline because of adverse terms of 
trade, generally deciining export production and an ever-rising population. 
Subsistence production continues to play a significant part in the 
economic life of the group; as a proportion of GOP, subsistence production is 
equal to 32 per cent in Western Samoa, and 26 per cent in Tonga which 
compares, for example, to only 8 per cent in Fiji. Opinion varies regarding 
the development potential of subsistence sectors, but at the present time they 
remain of considerable importance as a source of livelihood for many island 
countries. As well, they provide a measure of security against the vagaries 
of the world economy as a 'fall back' in times of economic crisis. 
Development prospects mainly depend on ~~e ability to develop presently 
unused land for agriculture and to improve the productivity of existing 
agriculture. Other possibilities lie with the development of agricultural 
processing and tourism. 
Countries in this group must contend with powerful constraints to 
development. Among the most intractable problems are the existence of rigid 
traditionally based land tenure systems, a low capacity to innovate, paucity 
of capital funds and skills, continuing vulnerability to international trade 
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instabilities and rapid population growth. Progress in selected areas will no 
doubt be made, but on a limited scale and irregularly, while adverse changes 
in world market conditions could quickly undermine the economic viability of 
apparently successful projects. For these and related reasons major 
breakthroughs in the foreseeable future cannot be expected. 
No Growth 
These are the I prob 1 em I economi es 
Tokelau, Niue and the Cook Islands. 
of the region: Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
Apart from sea-based opportunities, 
poverty of land-based resources is severe and this combined with tiny domestic 
markets, geographic isolation and expanding populations, provides the 
ingredients for economic malaise and decline. A few countries have been able 
to stave off subsistence poverty through sustained emigration and a heavy 
reliance on foreign aid. 
Copra is the lifeblood of the group but small amounts of handicrafts and 
fresh fruits and vegetables are exported in some cases. Exports of fruit 
juice, processed fruit and clothing are significant in the Cook Islands but 
these are based mainly on two islands -- Rarotonga and Mangaia. On the whole, 
export earnings are not only small but have been static except in the Cook 
Islands, where, in recent years, exports have climbed noticeably. 
Recent estimates of national income per head vary from $600 to $700, 
except for Kiribati and the Cook Islands with $450 and $1,200 respectively. 
These are relatively high and reflect aid dependency rather than domestic 
productive capacity. All have probably suffered a decline in real income per 
head in recent years. 
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An additional handicap suffered by this group (with the notable exception-
of Rarotonga) is the low productive capacity of subsistence sectors reflecting 
poor soils and other unfavourable environmental conditions. Poor subsistence 
sectors explain in part the unusually high dependence on imported food 
compared with the larger island countries, as well as the modest contribution 
of the subsistence production to GOP. Thus in the case of Kiribati and 
Tuvalu, it is estimated that subsistence production accounts for between 16 
and 18 per cent of GOP - about half the corresponding share for Western Samoa 
and Solomon Islands. 
With virtually no opportunities for growth, prospects for improved living 
conditions depend on aid, with emigration relieving population pressure. 
Possible regional and aid initiatives for small island countries will be 
discussed below and if implemented could result in major benefits. On the 
other hand, an absence of outside assistance would lead to an unavoidable 
drift to subsistence poverty. 
External Initiatives 
It is clear that by concentrating on natural resources as a basis for 
economic growth I have perhaps painted an unduly bright future for the larger 
of the Pacific island countries. The analysis has neglected the many 
obstacles that have to be addressed and overcome if the resource potential is 
to be realized -- a fact that applies both to large and small countries. On 
the supply Side, there are problems of raiSing development capital and 
securing the necessary expertise at all levels, but with limited local 
capacities, the bulk of these inputs must necessarily come from overseas. 
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Progress can also be obstructed by rigid adherence to customary forms of land 
tenure and socia-traditional attitudes, which impede the development of 
commercial agriculture and are inimical to innovation and development. 
On the demand side, problems arise over securing markets and favourable 
prices and the ability to cope with fluctuations in world market conditions. 
Poor export prices, if accompanied by rapidly rising import costs, can result 
in a serious decline in the terms of trade which can negate the effect of 
increased export production on national income. 
High costs of transport, both sea and air, and of public administrative 
services are further major constraints, particularly onerous for the more 
remote and dispersed countries. Testing social issues that invariably arise 
with development have to be faced, such as ensuring that the benefits of 
development are distributed on a reasonably equitable basis between the 
various social, occupational, ethnic and geographic groups. Also, almost all 
countries currently face serious balance of payments problems which need to be 
brought under control, stenming, in part. at least, from low export price 
levels and high import costs, including that for imported fuel. 
Such constraints remain an ever-present threat, frustrating efforts of 
island countries to realise their development aspirations. However, even from 
the most pessimistic assessment, the economic future of the larger countries 
still remains highly favourable by comparison with the smaller members of the 
region. A growing disparity in the economic circumstances of the Pacific 
islands is evident from the recent experience, but greater polarization can be 
expected in the future even allowing for the effects of foreign aid. One will 
find groups of countries thriving in a state of relative affluence amidst 
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those suffering economic deprivation - dramatic contrast to the traditional 
times when under subsistence conditions, economic status would have been 
fairly unifonn. 
Increasing fragility in the economic circumstances of the small island 
countries could have significant regional implications. Continuing economic 
weakness could leave little choice but to seek radical solutions including 
closer integration with a sympathetic metropolitan power and mass emigration. 
Such approaches will certainly undennine the coherence of the region making it 
difficult to pursue regionalism in a meaningful sense. Serious security 
problems could arise whose impact on the economic life of the region is bound 
to be detrimental. 
In the next 20 years will we see initiatives capable of promoting Pacific 
island development and assisting in particular the small resource-poor 
economies? The most interesting possibilities lie with foreign aid and 
regional initiatives. 
Regional Initiatives 
Much headway has been made in establishing a network of regional and 
sub-regional organizations that promote the economic life of the area and its 
constituent countries. The work of the South Pacific Forum and its 
Secretariat ann, SPEC, is well known at both the political and economic 
levels. SPC has been active over many years in the social and economic 
fields, while a variety of more specialised bodies have been established 
including the University of the South PaCific, the Pacific Forum Line (PFL), 
the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), Trade Commissions and the like. 
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Largely under the auspices of the above organizations, a multiplicity of 
regional projects and activities have been designed and implemented, many with 
strong financial support from the United Nations agencies and other 
international bodies. Apart from the activities undertaken by the above named 
organizations, other regional activities include those involving energy, 
telecommunications, the environment, sea-based mineral exploration and various 
aspects of technical assistance and research. 
A notable initiative has been the negotiation of a trade agreement (the 
South Pacific Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement or SPARTECA) between 
two groups of Forum members; island countries on the one hand and New Zealand 
and Australia on the other. The principal aim of the Agreement, which came 
into effect in 1982, is to achieve progressively duty free and unrestricted 
non-reciprocal access into the two metropolitan markets for a wide variety of 
island products, as a possible means of boosting island trade. For the island 
countries it is a significant breakthrough, opening the way for increasing 
exports, and several countries, particularly Fiji, have gained notably from 
it. However SPARTECA is not a free trade agreement and it excludes or 
severely restricts the entry of a certain group of products of interest to 
island countries. Complicated administrative requirements have also provided 
a barrier in some cases. Above all, SPARTECA tends to favour, albeit 
unintentionally, the larger, more industrially advanced countries so that it 
operates as another mechanism for widening regional inequalities. 
Much more needs to be done regionally to increase the benefits to Pacific 
countries from exploiting tuna resources within their 200 mile Exclusive 
Economic Zones. Many countries, particularly those where tuna is 
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concentrated, have high expectations about the development potential of this 
resource which is presently being exploited by distant fishing fleets with 
little benefit to island countries. The Forum Fishing Agency, which was 
established in 1979 with its headquarters in Honiara, carries out useful work 
in certain areas,· such as data collection and dissemination and keeping a 
registry of fishing vessels; but as Herr (1981) has noted, it contributed 
little initially towards policy coordination. Further progress in realising 
the potential of tuna calls for concerted action in the vital areas of 
surveillance (to prevent poaching); policy coordination; applied research on 
tuna stocks and migratory patterns; and planning of regional facilities and 
possibilities for joint venture activity. Indications that the United States 
is about to enter into a regional treaty to permit regulation of the highly 
migratory species is a hopeful sign which, if it eventuates, will undoubtedly 
open the way for a stronger regional effort to tackle some of these urgent 
problems. 
Though outwardly impressive, regional co-operation to date falls far short 
of what could be achieved. Progress has been most notable in the relatively 
'easy' areas where the benefits of regional co-operation are most obvious and 
can be realised without impinging too heavily on national sovereignty. 
Certainly, some tough areas have been addressed as for example, airline 
services and shipping, but an attempt to set up a regional airline failed and 
there is no certainty that the PFL will survive at least in its present form. 
Other difficult areas calling for closer economic integration and 
collaboration have been barely touched: industrial planning, regional trade 
co-operation, applied agricultural research and closer integration of 
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development planning and policy. All these and other related areas provide 
scope for future co-operation with attendant benefits to the region. 
Apart from these, there is scope for other initiatives that could promote 
development, particularly for the small island countries. For example, 
Pacific countries can strive to achieve a single regional voice in certain key 
international forums rather than, as often is the case, participating 
individually or as blocs. Greater unity would enable a truly regional 
viewpoint to be presented and would be advantageous in securing vital outside 
resources for development. 
Regional organizations need to give particular attention to the special 
needs of the smaller countries and ensure that this is reflected in their work 
programnes. Since the larger countries apparently gain the most benefit from 
the work of regional institutions, possible ways to remedy this bias should be 
considered. The provision directly of technical experts at no cost to the 
small islands might be one way of doing this; another is the establishment of 
an aid mechanism based on contributions (a regional tax?) from the larger, 
economically more advanced countries. Limited inter-island migration is 
another possibility. Through such initiatives it may be possible to reduce 
somewhat the extent of future economic polarization and disparity. 
Foreign Aid 
Pac.ific island countries have been receiving increasing amounts of foreign 
aid over the recent period, chiefly in the form of bilateral aid for budgetary 
and development assistance. As Table 2 shows, official development aid to the 
region, both as grants and concessionary loans, totalled just over $1 billion 
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in 1982, or $208 per head. There are several major recipients in aggregate 
terms but a notable feature is the relatively high amounts per head received 
by the ve~ small countries such as Niue, Tokelau and the Cook Islands. 
Given their limited financial capabilities, aid has played a large part in 
allowing island countries to meet some of their development aspirations. Aid 
has supplemented local budgetary resources rather heavily in some cases and 
this has been important in raising living standards above what would otherwise 
be sustainable; but for almost all countries aid has been crucial in 
supporting national development programmes and without it few such programmes 
would have been viable. 
The rationale for aid giving rests on a complexity of motives that are 
historic, political, economic and strategic in origin. It is clear, for 
example, that political and military considerations underly French aid to her 
Pacific territories and to newly independent Vanuatu, while economic factors, 
particularly access to raw materials, are at the forefront of Japanese aid. 
Australia and New Zealand consider themselves an integral part of the South 
Pacific 'cornnunity' and feel a special obligation to foster development among 
their small neighbours. Underlying this position are strategic conditions 
related to maintaining political stability among island countries and ensuring 
that they remain within the Western Alliance sphere of influence. In effect 
their strategic value is a resource whose economic role can be I measured I , or 
partly so by foreign aid. 
While willing donors are likely to continue to be available, prospects for 
increased aid are not promiSing and indeed, the value of aid in real terms 
could decline markedly. On one side, certain traditional donors are facing 
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difficult economic conditions and have had to limit their aid. There is also 
a belief in some quarters that aid levels are already high and have reached 
saturation point, so that further increases are not justified. On the other 
side, some island countries take seriously their pledge to achieve greater 
self-reliance and may not wish to increase aid dependence. (Note too, that 
Australian 'budgetary' aid to Papua New Guinea of just over $300 million, is 
scheduled to be phased out during the next few years.) 
With aid looking less promising, Pacific island countries will need to 
explore new avenues for augmenting the supply of development capital and 
ensuring its efficient use. They will necessarily have to turn increaSingly 
to domestic sources for mobilising development funds, including new ways of 
raising tax revenue, increasing surpluses from public enterprises, broadening 
the institutional base for mobilising savings and careful control of 
government administrative expenditure. It need hardly be said that among the 
small countries the scope for achieving major increases from these sources is 
severely limited. 
Possible regional measures that may be taken to assist small island 
countries have been suggested in the previous section. Certainly, the 
development of effective regional mechanisms in the fields of fisheries, 
energy, transportation and sea-based mineral exploration could benefit the 
small countries in a major way, but overall, there is a need on the part of 
the international community to come to grips with the development realities of 
the problem economies and to devise innovatory approaches. A possible first 
step is for donors to come to terms with the continuing need for aid support 
and to accept that much of this support is justified on social and welfare 
grounds rather than on strictly economic ones. 
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Australia's aid programme was recently subject to an intense review by an 
officially appointed team (the Jackson Committee). The team report 
highlighted the predicament of Kiribati and Tuvalu and proposed that Australia 
should establish a special immigration quota to help deal with the unique 
problems of these two islands. Such a proposal is under consideration, but it 
represents the kind of regional initiative that could play a crucial part in 
meeting the development problems of the small island states. One hopes that 
Australia will accept this challenge. 
Other Policy Initiatives 
What other possible strategies are there for the category II and III 
Pacific island countries to stave off the seemingly ineluctable march to 
subsistence impoverishment? Recent analysiS point to a number of 
possibilities, some of which call for regional action on a somewhat grand 
scale. Among the more interesting proposals are those suggesting closer 
economic integration with outside countries and special domestic efforts to 
achieve major advances, especially in the fields of population control and 
technological progress. 
In a recent article (1982), Higgins has analyzed the various development 
options facing small Pacific island countries. He points out that attempts to 
develop in isolation as independent sovereign states or revert to old colonial 
and neocolonial ties (in part embodied in multinationals) in an effort to 
become part of a large system are options that would in many ways lead to 
disaster. Much more promising is an option based on the integration of 
Pacific island countries as a means of establishing a 'rational network of 
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interactions and flows among regional economies of the South Pacific' (Higgins 
1982, p. x). He argues in favour of political integration which would pave 
the way for the formation of a regional socio-economic political system which 
would be empowered to decide on vital matters affecting the economic 
development of the region; for example co-ordinated development planning. 
According to Higgins, such a scheme is the only meaningful way for these 
countries to achieve increased prosperity. The benefits are perceived to lie 
not only in co-ordinated planning and agreed economic specialization but in 
the scope for harmonising the relations of Pacific island countries, treated 
as a single unit, with countries outside the system. 
The importance of political co-operation has been emphasized by Fisk 
(1982) as a strategy for Pacific island development. There are many practical 
difficulties in the way of securing such co-operation but Fisk feels that it 
could be achieved through existing regional mechanisms such as the South 
Pacific Forum. By working together in this way, these countries can gain 
extra muscle in the international area. This will have significant 
implications for most Pacific island countries not only in the development of 
major resources, such as fisheries and sea-based minerals, but also in the 
area of aid and migration. 
The development constraints and options facing the small island states 
have also been studied by Doumenge (1983). He maintains that these islands 
lack both the space and the economic volume to set up a durable domestic 
structure, the only guarantee of genuine economic viability (p. vii). Such 
viability, which he defines as the productive capacity required to enable the 
wishes and aspirations of the population to be satisfied, can be achieved by 
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maintaining 'continuous relations' with foreign partners. More specifically, 
Pacific island countries can benefit from establishing 'privileged links' with 
the outside 'power centres' or 'poles' such as are represented by the major 
Pacific rim countries (California, Japan, Hong Kong, eastern Australia and New 
Zealand) and in particular, with the great North Atlantic metropolices (London 
and Paris in Europe, New York and Miami in eastern North America). These 
poles are multipurpose, with the capacity to create 'vital stimuli' as a base 
for generating development among island countries. 
Much the same conclusions are expressed in a report prepared by a team of 
experts in 1979, which, under the auspicies of ADB, surveyed the agricultural 
possibilities and overall economic prospects of selected Pacific countries. 
According to the team's report, a possible solution for the economic plight of 
the small countries is to become more closely integrated with a large 
metropolitan country, such as is represented by the present relationship 
between the Cook Islands and New Zealand. .This would ensure a regular outlet 
for surplus population on the one hand, and ensure a source of foreign aid on 
the other, but the cost would be to compromise economic and political 
independence. 
For the larger countries, closer economic integration with outside 
countries can have significant implications for trade policy as noted by 
Dornmen (1980). Here economic viability depends on the capacity to foresee 
changes in world economic conditions and to adapt to them by moving from one 
form of specialisation to another rather than undertaking a diversity of 
activities simultaneously. Favoured activities will be those that have a high 
income elasticity in world markets; but with few productive options, such a 
strategy has little relevance for the small countries. 
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The importance of domestic initiatives in shaping policies to save the 
economy from subsistence poverty has been highlighted in recent articles by 
Tisdell and Fairbairn (1984) and Fairbairn and Kakazu (1984). Employing a 
theoretical approach, Tisdell and Fairbairn show the island economies facing a 
restricted range of resources and population growth. Economic growth can 
occur but it is only a temporary phenomenon for, in time, the economy will 
revert back to subsistence levels as it comes up against population pressure, 
resources depletion and unfavourable international market conditions. It can 
even fall below subsistence levels if traditional skills are lost during the 
'development' phase. 
Against this scenario, Tisdell and Fairbairn explore the possibility of 
escape through appropriate planning initiatives. A first possibility is 
population control which government can promote through family planning and 
related programmes (and migration). The second is increased productivity and 
strengthening of subsistence sectors through the intensive application of 
technology to productive sectors. Taken in combination, changes in these two 
areas can lead to economic growth and an escape from low-level subsistence. 
But it is apparent that in practice, achieving major improvements in 
productivity calls for structural changes of a kind that few island countries 
would be prepared to undertake, and in the case of small islands, the 
potential is severely circumscribed by the small scale of the productive 
sectors. 
Fairbairn and Kakazu also demonstrate the possibility of economic collapse 
by small countries and a consequent reversion to subsistence poverty for much 
the same reasons noted above. To prevent such a collapse, they propose a 
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development strategy that gives greater emphasis to subsistence sector 
production, especially foodstuffs, as opposed to commercial production for 
export. The advantage of the strategy is twofold: first, it will reduce the 
severity of balance of payments crises that invariably follow' an 
over-commitrnent to export production; and secondly, it will result in greater 
self-sufficiency in food production and hence national economic independence. 
The swing back towards the subsistence economy implies curbing material 
aspirations of the population and this paves the way for achieving a more 
sustainable balance between these aspirations and resource capabilities. 
Finally, two relevant points for the designing of development strategy can 
be noted. First, smallness (especially if associated with compactness) means 
that certain national and community needs can be quickly met often with modest 
expenditure of capital funds. This can apply in the case of health facilities 
(presumably only one major hospital will be required), technical training 
facilities, wharves and airstrips and tar sealed roading. Furthermore, 
smallness can facilitate the spread of new techniques favourable to production. 
Secondly, small island countries have a potential to develop activities 
which exploit the advantages of insular remoteness and isolation. Wace (1980) 
has identified many such opportunities ranging from plant research and export 
of cut flowers to the establishment of testing grounds for noxious materials 
and military bases. leaving aside military bases, such 'remoteness specific' 
activities can provide a useful source of cash income making for greater 




With prospects of increasing polarization in the economic conditions of 
Pacific island countries, particular attention needs to be directed at the 
plight of the smaller countries faced with limited or no growth scenarios. 
While continuing growth and improving living conditions can be expected to 
occur among the larger countries, the economic life of the smaller countries 
will remain static and probably decline through the sheer lack of development 
options. Unaided, some may find themselves in the next decade suffering a 
degree of subsistence poverty hithert~ unknown in the region. 
Addressing the needs of the small resource poor countries calls for 
innovatory approaches and this paper has suggested a few such possibilities in 
relation to aid and regional cooperation. But continuing heavy aid dependence 
is anathema in some cases while prospects for· increased aid are not 
promising. Perhaps it is time to take a more serious look at some of the 
recent proposals concerning the establishment of broader-based cooperative 
systems for the region as suggested, for example, by Higgins. A degree of 
political integration would provide the foundation for a stronger South 
Pacific Corrmunity and would, for one thing, clear the way for further major 
regional initiatives in the economic and social fields. Many benefits would 
ensue, but so far as the smaller island states are concerned, such a system 
will provide a valuable framework for focusing regional and international 
attention on their special problems and needs, and above all, will enable the 
development of meaningful solutions in a region-wide sharing partnership with 
their more fortunate neighbours. There are problems aplenty in the practical 
implementation of such a scheme but it may be the most effective means of 

















POPULATION, PER CAPITA INCOME AND MAIN EXPORT 
PRODUCTS OF SOUTH PACIFIC COUNTRIES 
POPULATION PER CAPITA MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS 
1982 (000) INOOME1 ($) 
33.9 4060 Tuna 
16.9 llH}n Fresh fruit and vegetables 
clothing, processed fruit and copra 
82.4 830 Copra, fish 
658.0 163()n Sugar, gold, coconut oil, 
fish 
153.8 4600II Coconut oil, vanilla 
108.4 486()n n.a. 
59.3 42()n Copra 
32.8 n.a. n.a. 
8.4 n.a. Phosphate 
3.2 620p Fruit products, copra 
18.4 4000 Vegetables 
0\ 
"-J 
New Caledonia 145.0 79008 Nickel and products 
Palau 12.4 n.a. n.a. 
Papua New Guinea 3126.6 82Gn Copper and concentrates, 
cocoa, coconut products 
Solomon Islands 243.0 67Gn Fish and fish preparations 
copra, timber, palm oil 
Tokelau 1.5 650 Copra, handicrafts 
Tonga 99.5 460f Coconut oil, dessicated 
coconut, fruit and 
vegetables 
Tuvalu 7.7 590f Copra 
Vanuatu 125.6 550 Copra, fish, frozen meat 
Wallis and Futuna 11.9 1030 Copra 
Western Samoa 157.0 605 Copra, cocoa, taro, timber 
1. Based on official estimates for either 1979 or 1980 except for Fiji and 
Western Samoa which are for 1982 and 1983 respectively. National income 
figures are GOP except for Guam, Vanuatu and Western Samoa which are GNPi 
with GOP at factor cost denoted by f, at market prices by m and producer 
prices by p. 
Sources: South Pacific CommiSSion, Demographic Unit, Noumea (for population 




OfriCIAl D[VELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (OOA) FL/taiS BY SOURcr AI;D R[CIPI[IH 19J1Z IS Hill 1011) 
~,I ~ .-.. -----. ----. -- - -- -. ---,- -- . _. -, TOTAl I IUTI-AUSTPALIA UIIITEto U/IITED OTIIER I TOTIIl ADa [OF uriOP LATERAL ZEAlAND IUNGDOH STATES BILATERAl 8ILATERAL 




0.1 9.7 0.3 
--
0.5 0.1 
fIJI lS.9 0.3 3.1 3.2 2.0 6.1 30.' 
--















O.l 0.2 0.3 
lfIuru 












-- -- -- I •• 3 -- -- 0.2 --
Plct ftc Is (USA) 
-- -- -- --
160.1 C.5 i lM.6 -- -- 0.2 O.C p, PUI New Gu i net 263.6 0.3 2.0 0.1 
--
10.6 281.6 C.l 18.C 1.1 10.1 













Ton;a 6.1 0.2 2.3 1.1 1.0 1.8 12.S 0.2 2.5 0.8 I. I 
Tuv.lu 0.9 
--
D •• 3.5 
-- 0.8 5.6 
--
0.5 0.2 
--V.nuitu 4.1 9.6 0.9 7.8 
--
0.8 23.8 0.2 1.3 0.5 0.1 
:...1115 , futun. 
--
7.2 





Io:es t. m Samoa 5.8 
--
3.3 
-- 1.0 5.6 15.7 1.2 2.5 0.8 2.0 
Unall oc. ted 4.7 3.4 12.0 0.8 2.0 1.3 24.2 
-- -- -- --
TOTAL 317.6 358 •• 39.9 37.3 166.1 36.8 956.1 8.4 31.8 1.2 17.3 
SOURCE: COII1piled from comPuter printouts provided by DECO, Pari5 And Table 1 (Population) 
TOTAL TOTAL 
HULTI- BILATERAL (01'4 
LATERAL HUll 1- f'['! 
LATERAL Hi:;:>lsl 
-
0.9 10.6 627.6 
S.S 36. I 54.9 
0.6 116.6 ' 11:8.4 
0.7 15.4 259.6 
-- -- --
0.4 161.8 1111'.2 
0.2 4.5 14t'2.2 
0.6 165.2 573.0 
35. I 316.1 101.3 
6.0 28.4 117.1 
0.1 1.9 1291.8 
C.6 17. I ! In.2 
0.7 6.3 eZ.1 
I 
2.7 26.5 I 210.9 
0.2 1.4 I 625.5 j 






M.8 1020.9 i 208.5 
I 
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